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 Chapter 6 
 On the resistance of the instrument 
 Tom  Cochrane 
 Emotional expression is often regarded as central to the purpose and meaning of art. In large part 
this is because it encompasses a number of different values, each more or less present as a product 
of the awareness, deliberation, inventiveness, and social coordination to be found in the expres-
sive act (cf. Scherer in Chapter 5). My goal here will be to outline these values in an act of musical 
performance, highlighting the role played by the  resistance of the instrument to the immediate 
realization of the musician’s intentions. Resistance is also something that comes in degrees, and by 
examining some recent trends in musical instrument technologies, I will argue that relative  trans-
parency is also a viable choice, depending on the values to which one aspires. 
 Let us begin by discerning the values to be found at a general level in the expression theory of 
art. A classic statement of the theory is R. G. Collingwood’s (1938) book  The Principles of Art . Here 
Collingwood articulates the view that the business of art “proper” is to express the emotional state 
of the artist. Collingwood means something very specifi c by the term “expression,” however. It 
is not simply a matter of revealing one’s emotion. In a famous passage, he describes the process 
involved:
 At fi rst, he is conscious of having an emotion, but not conscious of what this emotion is. All he is con-
scious of is a perturbation or excitement, which he feels going on within him, but of whose nature he 
is ignorant. While in this state, all he can say about his emotion is: “I feel . . .  I don’t know what I feel.” 
From this helpless and oppressed condition he extricates himself by doing something which we call 
expressing himself. 
 The artist begins with a vague, inchoate impulse which he or she then clarifi es by means of expres-
sion. This is a matter of bringing the state to full articulate consciousness, so is quite unlike the 
casual betrayal of one’s emotional state (which could occur without the awareness of the sub-
ject). Collingwood is also keen to emphasize that the artist does not simply reproduce some 
pre-conceptualized idea, for that would be mere craft. He rather gives form for the fi rst time to 
a  new mental state, individualized in its own unique way in the act of expression. Thus while 
the value of expression might sometimes be conceptualized in terms of its cognitive benefi t, of 
enabling an individual to gain some self-understanding, it is also rooted in the value of creativity. 
The struggle to express oneself is a means towards self-manifestation or self-becoming. And if it is 
engaged in sincerely, it cannot help but result in something original, because it will be a product of 
the artist’s individual experience. 
 A similar theme is to be found Hegel’s (1835)  Lectures on Fine Art : i 
 The universal and absolute need from which art (on its formal side) springs has its origin in the fact 
that man is a  thinking consciousness, i.e. that man draws out of himself and puts  before himself what 
he is and whatever else is. Things in nature are only  immediate and  single , while man as spirit  dupli-
cates himself . . . . This aim he achieves by altering external things whereon he impresses the seal of 
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his inner being and in which he now fi nds again his own characteristics. Man does this in order, as a 
free subject, to strip the external world of its infl exible foreignness and to enjoy in the shape of things 
only an external realization of himself. Even a child’s fi rst impulse involves this practical alteration of 
external things; a boy throws stones into the river and now marvels at the circles drawn in the water 
as an effect in which he gains an intuition of something that is his own doing . . . . [Introduction, 
Section 6i] 
 Both Hegel and Collingwood, then, align artistic creativity with a supposedly universal drive; to 
make manifest our inner natures. Artistic expression simply brings this drive to its highest pitch of 
sophistication. And why should we want to make manifest our inner natures? Its motivation seems 
to be drawn from the fundamental will to live and to fl ourish. As such, no further justifi cation 
seems necessary. That’s just the kind of creature we are. 
 At the same time, however, Collingwood recognizes that the artist is interested in sharing his 
impressions with the wider community. Art to some extent is a public service since the artist 
expresses emotions on behalf of the audience. The artist “is singular in his ability to take the initia-
tive in expressing what all feel, and all can express” (Collingwood 1958, p. 119). This is no mere 
side-benefi t to expression, but an important part of bringing the artist’s expressive intent to frui-
tion. For if other people cannot re-create the artist’s emotional state by engagement with the work, 
then the artist cannot be sure that he or she has had a genuine aesthetic experience (Collingwood 
1958, pp. 311–15). 
 For Tolstoy, the value of sharing one’s emotions is paramount. Adopting a fairly simplistic theory 
of expression as a kind of emotional contagion he claims that, “every art causes those to whom the 
artist’s feeling is transmitted to unite in soul with the artist, and also with all who receive the same 
impression” (Tolstoy 1899, p. 163). Indeed, so important is the value of sharing for Tolstoy that 
he demands that art only express emotions that everyone can share; emotions such as merriment, 
pity, cheerfulness, and tranquility or “feelings fl owing from the perception of our sonship to God 
and of the brotherhood of man” (Tolstoy 1899, p. 164). All other arts either unite some people at 
the expense of alienating others (such as patriotic arts) or are inaccessible to the masses. An unfor-
tunate consequence of this view acknowledged and accepted by Tolstoy is that Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony turns out to be an inferior piece of work because it is rather complicated. Collingwood, 
in contrast, takes the rather more sympathetic line that the artist need only share his emotions with 
a limited subset of likeminded fellows—and indeed that it would be insincere for the artist to play 
to the lowest common denominator. 
 We have seen that for Collingwood, the main point of expressing oneself is that it brings one’s 
creative insight to fruition. The value of sharing is somewhat subservient to the value of creativity 
or self-realization (including perhaps, the self-realization of certain members of the audience). 
However, Tolstoy clearly regards the value of sharing emotions in different terms. There are strong 
moral overtones to Tolstoy’s discussion; that art should contribute to the interpersonal harmony 
of the community. And it is plausible that sharing emotions through art can stimulate feelings of 
belonging; of overcoming loneliness or the more profound worry that others cannot understand 
what it’s like to be you. While we need not insist with Tolstoy that art is best when it promotes a 
quantitatively maximal level of sharing, we can still recognize that the sharing of emotions is a 
valid goal for art. And again, like the drive for creativity, we can derive the value of sharing from 
the basically social nature of humans. We are just the kind of creatures that thrive in mutually sup-
portive environments. 
 There is also another, less frequently noted value to be found in expression, that of pleasure. It is 
a value compatible with both Tolstoy’s ideal of emotion sharing and Collingwood’s ideal of crea-
tive articulation. But we also fi nd it explicitly discussed in Dewey’s (1934/1980)  Art as Experience , 
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particularly in connection with the resistance that the environment offers to one’s emotional 
impulses:
 Nor without resistance from surroundings would the self become aware of itself; it would have neither 
feeling nor interest, neither fear nor hope, neither disappointment nor elation. Mere opposition that 
completely thwarts, creates irritation and rage. But resistance that calls out though generates curiosity 
and solicitous care, and, when it is overcome and utilized, eventuates in elation. [pp. 59–60] 
 Dewey has a rather broad notion of resistance that encompasses the whole struggle of the artist to 
bring objective form to his or her expressive intent. As the above passage indicates, Dewey regards 
resistance as a necessary condition for self-consciousness since a creature that never met resistance 
to its impulses could not become conscious of the independence of the world to its will, and thus 
its distinction from the world. But in addition to all this metaphysical talk, we also see the elation 
that accompanies a successful expressive act. To  express , in the traditional sense of expelling some-
thing, of overcoming some resistant material, feels good. 
 We can now see the ways in which the various values of expression are drawn out in the act 
of musical performance. Beginning with the value of pleasure, we observe that the challenges 
involved in getting a good sound out of a musical instrument are, for the musician at least, an 
important part of their  experience of the music. There is an immediate connection between the 
energy required to do something and one’s sense of power, or between the ability to transcend the 
limitations of the instrument and one’s sense of grace or freedom. Eric Clarke (2006) for instance 
describes the pleasures involved in interacting in a controlled and fl uent manner with an instru-
ment that is often “unbearably uncomfortable or uncooperative.” He cites a case in which a pianist 
reports enjoying the use of his thumb in a certain passage even though it is not the most effi cient 
fi ngering available. He also describes his own heightened enjoyment of violin music when per-
forming in a comfortable key. 
 Since these various feelings of enjoyment, power, or gracefulness are generated as a result of 
interacting with the musical instrument, the physical act of performance must contribute to the 
emotional state felt by the performer. Were the instrument  not to a degree resistant to the inten-
tions of the musician, their emotional state would be different. As such, these pleasures are not 
incidental to the act of expression. If the performer is engaging in a Collingwoodian act of creative 
 self-expression —the kind of immediate creative articulation found not just in improvisation but 
any creative interpretation of a score—the physical interaction with the instrument will also shape 
that mental state expressed by the performer in the musical event. In these circumstances, then, we 
should recognize that the instrument is not merely a means to the end of realizing some pre-existing 
expressive sentiment, but a vital part of shaping expressive content from the beginning. 
 In a previous paper (Cochrane 2008) I described at length how the performer may use the 
instrument to think through his or her emotion, and that the music and its means of production 
may even be construed as a literal component of the musician’s mental state. My concern in that 
paper was to establish the point that musicians may use music to physically extend the cognition 
of emotions. What I would like to elaborate on here, however, are the ways in which the interac-
tion with a musical instrument also serves the  values that motivate the act of musical expression in 
the fi rst place. We may note, for instance, that while the pleasure of performance is perhaps most 
intensely felt by the performer, the audience is also capable of vicariously enjoying that pleasure 
by empathically re-creating the performer’s movements. When we watch a concert pianist, even if 
we have no experience of playing a piano ourselves, we have a rough idea of what it takes to press 
on a piano key and produce a sound. As a result, the way that the pianist moves about the instru-
ment has the potential to convey a great deal of information about the attitude of the performer 
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(cf., again, Clarke 2006). We can detect, for example, fl amboyance in movements which we know 
to be quite unnecessary to the production of the sound. The point generalizes to the full range of 
emotional attitudes that may be conveyed in the interaction with an instrument; the sense of rage 
conveyed by an aggressive strike, or desolation conveyed in trying but failing to produce a sound. 
As such, the physical resistance afforded by the instrument is a signifi cant means by which such 
emotional information may be shared. 
 We should admit here that at least some of the performer’s movements may simply be the prod-
uct of tics or ingrained habits. Moreover, some of the performer’s gestures are likely to be inten-
tional and communicative, where others unconsciously betray emotional attitudes, and still others 
are determined by purely physiological factors. In many cases it may be impossible to separate 
these various infl uences. Still, this is no different from the complexities and ambiguities that attend 
the interpretation of everyday body language. We are nevertheless prone to draw inferences about 
personality and attitude on observing such behavior. Collingwood would no doubt wish to exclude 
non-intentional movements from the artistic event properly so-called, but I fi nd myself unwilling 
to draw such sharp distinctions in this regard. Any musician performing in front of an audience 
must accept that the audience will sensitively engage with the entire perceivable event. And if we 
were to learn that the groans and expressive behaviors of a pianist like Glenn Gould were entirely 
unconscious, I do not believe this would be suffi cient grounds to exclude these factors from our 
appreciation of his performances, or indeed of him as a person. 
 In addition to the value of emotion sharing, the resistance of the instrument also serves the value 
of creativity. It is in exploring the capacities of the instrument that the musician’s creative imagina-
tion is stimulated because it allows him or her to see what is possible (see again Cochrane 2008 for 
discussion). But the performer must often also seek inventive ways to adjust to the physical con-
straints of the instrument in the pursuit of his or her expressive intent. Stravinsky (1956) makes 
this point in his  Poetics of Music when he observes that constraints are necessary to stimulate the 
creative imagination. And T ō ru Takemitsu makes a similar point in with regards to the traditional 
Japanese string instrument, the biwa:
 The biwa could be called the mother of Japanese music. The major characteristic that sets it apart 
from Western instruments is the active inclusion of noise in its sound whereas Western instruments, 
in the process of their development, sought to eliminate noise. It may sound contradictory to refer 
to “beautiful noise,” but the biwa is constructed to create such a sound. That sound is called sawari, a 
term that also has come to be used in a general sense . . .  The term sawari, which also means “touch,” 
may additionally mean “obstacle.” Thus, sawari is the “apparatus of an obstacle” itself. In a sense it is 
an intentional inconvenience that creates a part of the expressiveness of the sound. Compared to the 
Western attitude toward musical instruments, this deliberate obstruction represents a very different 
approach to sound . . . . The monthly biological function in women is also referred to in Japanese as the 
‘monthly sawari’—a natural inconvenience for women but essential in producing children. For me 
there is something symbolic about this: the inconvenience is potentially creative. In music the artifi cial 
inconvenience in creating sound produces the sound. The resulting biwa sound is strong, ambiguous, 
deeply signifi cant. [Takemitsu 1995, pp. 65–6] 
 What Takemitsu is describing here is a traditional way to resolve aesthetic problems; to ironically 
embrace the imperfection, to intensify it, marking it out as an intended aesthetic feature, thereby 
allowing us to appreciate its beauty. It once again underlines the way in which the artist’s expres-
sion is guided by his or her physical medium; accepting and celebrating the natural qualities of 
the object. But while Takemitsu is correct to claim that the development of Western instruments 
has often sought to eliminate noise, he is wrong if he also wishes to imply that Western music is 
not also guided by the embrace of imperfections or the more general creative interplay with the 
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resistant instrument. These seem to be musical universals. Note for instance the rise of “extended 
technique” in a number of instrumental performance practices. For example, oboists now quite 
commonly employ multiphonic effects—where all those cracks and whistles that were once the 
bane of the oboe performer’s life are now deliberately employed. 
 The same guiding values can be seen in the rise of computer music. Synthesized sounds have 
permitted the average individual, lacking access to a backyard orchestra, to employ a far more 
diverse range of sounds in their creative endeavors. Naturally the sounds produced by keyboard 
synthesizers are often fl at and homogeneous in comparison to what can be achieved with the 
original instruments—though the capacity of computers to reproduce the characteristics of dif-
ferent instruments has greatly improved. A greater worry for computer-based musicians is that 
when programming musical performances, the regularities of timbre, attack, and rhythm result 
in a sound that is inexpressive and dull. As a result, computer musicians often spend a great deal 
of time reintroducing irregularities; the mistunings or distortions of an more intense attack, or 
slight inconsistencies of timing that the music sound “more human.” What we see here then is that 
the opening up of creative capacities is supplemented by a desire to simulate the feeling of a live 
performance, of a real performer with whom the listener can enjoy a sense of sharing; perhaps not 
sharing emotions specifi cally, but certainly a sense of life. 
 A similar issue is faced in recent developments in interfaces for musical expression; a general 
movement in present-day musical practice towards designing new instruments for employment 
in live performance, typically mediated by electronics. The same drive that pushes us to diversify 
the sonic palette also pushes us to fi nd new ways to interact physically with sound, implicitly rec-
ognizing that the attitude taken towards the device shapes expressive content. At the same time, a 
common complaint about such instruments is that it is opaque to the listener what the performer 
is actually doing to get the sounds out of them. This problem is compounded by the frequent use 
of algorithmic routines, and even probabilistic outputs, such that a signifi cant aspect of the music 
is not controlled directly by the performer at all. Where there is a disconnection between the elec-
tronic generation of the sounds and the physical means to activate these processes, we have no idea 
to what extent the performer’s movements express emotional content, or even attitudes as basic as 
success or failure of intent (see Fels 2004; Gurevich and Fyans 2011 for discussion). This may be 
somewhat alienating for the audience. As such, the new-interface community is faced with fi nd-
ing effective ways in which the intention of the performers, their skill, and expressive goals, can be 
communicated to the audience, again, to satisfy the listeners’ and performers’ values of sharing. 
 We have seen how the resistance of the instrument contributes to the creative act of the per-
former. For the listener also, an appreciation of the physical resistance of the instrument con-
tributes to a signifi cant degree to their sense of what is going on with the performer, and as a 
consequence their empathic sense of the performer’s feelings. There is, however, a counter-trend 
in the development of instrument technologies seemingly aimed at  reducing the resistance of the 
instrument—that is, increasing the transparency between the performer’s state of mind and the 
musical results. One important recent development in the new interfaces movement is the use 
of physiological sensors to measure such variables as heart rate, skin conductance (sweat), facial 
expressions, muscle tension, and skin temperature. It is now possible to directly sonify these signals 
to produce sounds (e.g. Knapp and Lyon 2011). 
 In particular, it has been the goal of my own research of late to use these signals to generate 
music that appropriately matches the actual emotional state of the performer—with the opera-
tional target that listeners can identify the self-reported emotion of the performer with a success 
rate comparable to our capacity to detect emotions in facial and vocal expressions, if not better. 
I call this system “the mood organ.” ii An important theoretical component of the mood organ is 
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that the various signals collected by the physiological sensors contribute proportionally to dimen-
sional measures of emotional experience. For instance, muscle tension and heart rate contribute 
to the emotion dimension of power (similar, though more narrowly specifi ed, than the common 
dimension “arousal”—see Cochrane 2009 for discussion). Changes in mouth corner position and 
heart rate variability contribute to the dimension of valence (rises in these measures tend to signal 
more positive emotions). The correlations here are not always entirely unambiguous—heart rate 
variability also increases in the emotion of disgust—clearly a negative emotion (see Kreibig 2010 
for an extensive review). Yet when the various physiological signals are combined, dimensional 
correlates can be more reliably discerned. These dimensions are then fairly straightforwardly used 
to manipulate musical variables. For instance, a rise in positive valence can be made to increase 
the harmonic consonance of the music. Because the physiological signals continuously update 
the dimensional variables, I use looping samples than can be triggered and gradually adjusted in 
various ways, comparable to minimalist music. But the music also tends to fl uctuate expressively 
in ways that we never fi nd in minimalist music, leading to a musical result that is surprisingly 
unpredictable—displaying a striking  lack of long-term emotional narrative. 
 Now to the extent that anyone off the street can put on the various sensors, and allow music to be 
produced regardless of his or her intentions, this system could not, according to Collingwood and 
Dewey, count as expressive. The sounds produced would  not be art properly so called, but craft, 
or the mere betrayal of emotion. Moreover, since I have been extolling the virtues of instrumental 
resistance for promoting the values of emotion sharing, creativity, and pleasure, one might be 
forgiven for asking, what is the point of this system? 
 While it is true that the na ï ve use of such a system is not artistic, we could understand my role in 
developing the device as comparable to that of an architect who shapes the experiences of others. 
I have of course had to make musical choices as to what particular sounds should accompany what 
physiological changes. And although the mood organ is mechanically translating bodily states, 
it also  feels like something to hear one’s bodily states so translated, and it cannot help but affect 
the on-going development of one’s emotional state. Subject and sound are locked into a tightly 
reciprocal relationship, just as we fi nd in the attempt to express one’s emotions with a traditional 
musical instrument. Moreover it is anticipated that, after prolonged use, some people will develop 
expertise in controlling their physiological responses by means of this musical feedback (though 
sweat and heart rate variability are rather more diffi cult to control than facial expression and mus-
cle tension). As a consequence, some people should be able intentionally plan the music produced 
and give it a long-term narrative structure of their choosing. 
 The difference between this system and ordinary musical expression is also somewhat analogous 
to that between photography and painting. That is, there is a causal mechanism involved in this 
system that reliably produces an “image” of the performer’s current bodily state. But as in the case 
of photography, it should still be possible to adapt the system to one’s own ends in controlling the 
content that is imaged. In photography, we also appreciate that we are witnessing scenes that have 
concrete reality, or at least did so, and there are interesting effects concerning whether the subjects 
of a photograph are aware of being photographed. Similarly, the listener to a mood organ produc-
tion may appreciate the glimpse into the actual inner workings of another person’s body, and may 
contemplate shades of sincerity and emotional commitment that should be quite distinct from 
that of traditional musical performance, since it is often the case that traditional performers must 
remain calm if they are to successfully carry off the physical demands of the music (though see 
Scherer in Chapter 5 for a discussion of the variations involved here). 
 Besides the various creative uses to which this system might be put, however, the value that this sys-
tem is primarily designed to promote is that of sharing emotions. This is not meant in the sense that a 
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listener may read off the emotional state of the performer by listening to the music produced (though 
certain scientifi c goals may be achieved in that way) but that it provides a way for multiple performers 
to mutually engage in the formation of their emotional states. In particular, having established ways 
to transform an individual’s bodily responses into music, the idea is to perform the same procedure 
for several people at once. This can be achieved in a number of different ways. We can simply allow 
that several performers individually produce music in a common setting (perhaps restricting ways in 
which the music produced can clash). Alternatively, we can divide up responsibility over the musical 
product such that one individual’s physiological responses are responsible for one aspect of the music 
(for instance the harmony) while another’s responses are responsible for its rhythm. Or fi nally, we 
may simply take an average of the group’s signal and use that to generate our musical variables. In all 
these cases, we can observe the way the performers’ mutual awareness of the music produced results 
in natural adjustments and synchronizations of their emotional states, and quite possibly feelings of 
intense rapport, as a consequence of their mutual awareness of this synchronization. 
 Naturally it is possible for performers of traditional instruments to engage in the collabora-
tive expression of emotional states in comparable ways. But the mediation of instrumental skill 
presents considerable barriers to the sincere committal towards one’s own and other’s musical 
productions, because one is typically occupied with a critical stance towards the quality of the 
music produced, and is often unsure of the emotional committal of the other participants. A cer-
tain standardization and automaticity of the expressive means helps to alleviate these worries, just 
as it does in ordinary verbal communication—where we are (relatively) more confi dent in sharing 
common meaning for our terms. iii 
 Compare this with the historical development of instrumental technologies and we see that the 
rise in complexities and variances of expression are often tempered by moves towards standardi-
zation. Take for example the way that the shape of the violin bow has evolved since the Baroque 
period. The straight long bows that we fi nd today were not established as a standard until the early 
19th century. Prior to this time, a number of different shapes were employed. Bows of the Baroque 
period are often shorter, with an arch-shaped frame and pointed tips. These qualities make it 
harder to produce an even tone. Yet violinist Girolamo Bottiglieri has emphasized that they afford 
the player a greater range of possible sonorities. Similarly the oboe of the Baroque period is a con-
siderably less complex instrument than today’s oboe with its mass of silver keys and piping, and as 
a result it is much less stable and more diffi cult to play. Yet the oboist B é atrice Zawodnik describes 
the older oboe as more fl exible, and thereby possessing a greater expressive potential (Bottiglieri 
and Zawodnik 2009). 
 In both cases, the demand for an instrument that can more reliably produce a certain sort of 
sound has resulted in developments that have sacrifi ced a certain degree of personal fl exibility. 
When one must perform ensemble music, or follow the instructions of a musical score, there is a 
pressure to conform to certain standards. And given enough time, these pressures will, in a man-
ner analogous to natural selection, result in instruments that can more effectively satisfy these 
pressures. The value ultimately behind these developments is, I submit, the value of the shared 
engagement in musical performance, because they are essentially solving a coordination problem. 
They allow many people to coordinate the expression of their emotions, guided towards an ideal 
of shared emotion. The mood organ is geared towards the same ideal. 
 Conclusion 
 Expression theory synthesizes a number of different values: the value of creativity, sharing, pleas-
ure, and associated values of (self-) understanding and moral harmony. Different authors prioritize 
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these values in different ways, while still pointing to basically the same, quite fundamental behav-
ior—the act of expression—an act common to our everyday communicative behaviors, brought 
to its highest pitch or fl uency in the creation of art. 
 Developments in musical instrument technologies have continued to be driven by the values 
inherent in artistic expression, particularly with respect to enriching our capacities for creativity, 
and sharing our emotions with others. Neither of these fundamental human values is in any dan-
ger of being undermined in our musical culture. For while they may sometimes seem to be in ten-
sion, as soon as we develop new ways to satisfy one value we tend to seek ways to satisfy the other as 
well. At the same time, we should recognize that musical expression is achieved not just at the indi-
vidual level but also at the group level, and that as a consequence what may appear to be confl icting 
developments (i.e. towards complexity or simplifi cation, towards resistance or transparency) may 
simply refl ect the same ideals pursued at different levels of human organization. 
 Finally, while new technological developments certainly offer exciting new musical opportuni-
ties, there is no suggestion here that our means of expression are superior to those of the past. 
Because musical expression is essentially geared towards the self-realization of the individual, and 
how we understand each other, it is something that must be renewed in each generation, making 
use of the materials at hand. 
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 Notes 
 i  Th is is not surprising, since Hegel was a major infl uence on Benedetto Croce (1902/1992), who was 
himself major infl uence on Collingwood. Th anks to Jenefer Robinson for pointing this out. 
 ii  Th is is aft er a fi ctional device described in Philip K. Dick’s book  Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 
which is used to regulate emotions. 
 iii  Th e automaticity of the system will also free-up the “performers” to emotionally interact with each other 
in more everyday ways. 
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